An Ultimate Check Still Under Study: The Panel Could Replace the Operating Entity and the President

The Panel’s overall mechanism has largely closed the loop. On mutual-aid appeals, refund disputes and disagreements related to joining the Commune, anyone can submit the matter to the Panel for review; the Panel can also deliberate on the Commune’s public affairs, amend the community covenant, check whether the platform has acted according to the covenant, and require rectification and public disclosure of records where the platform has broken the rules.

But the system still lacks one last safety valve:

Today the Panel can rule on individual cases and require the platform to correct its mistakes. But what if an extreme situation arises: the company operating the Commune, or the person in charge, persistently and seriously violates the covenant, harms the common interests of all members, or is objectively unable to keep operating the Commune? The current mechanism can only publicize the breach; it cannot, on members’ behalf, withdraw the mandate to operate.

So we have a long-term idea:

In the future, under very strict trigger conditions and a very high voting threshold, the Panel would be able, in extreme circumstances, to act on behalf of all members in revoking the current operator’s entrusted qualification to run KangAi Commune, and then choose a new operating entity together.

Two crucial points should be stated plainly:

1. Even if the vote passes, the Panel cannot directly force out the company as registered with the business authorities or forcibly remove the President. A company is governed by company law, and members are not shareholders of that company. The meaning of such a vote is that all of us members decide together: we will no longer entrust this institution to keep running the mutual-aid community. If the other side refuses to hand over mutual-aid records and escrow authority over funds, the ruling can serve as important evidence for members seeking legal remedies.

2. This power is a last resort and will never be used casually. Ordinary disagreement over a case, differing views on the rules, or a single incomplete rectification would not trigger this process. It is aimed only at extreme cases: long-term, serious harm to the common interests of all members, refusal to rectify, and an operating entity that has objectively lost the capacity to operate.

There is considerable risk here:

If the threshold is poorly designed, a minority could easily exploit it, frequently launching moves to replace the operator and disrupting normal cost-sharing, mutual-aid review and disbursement, hurting everyone. And even if members choose a new operator, the smooth handover of fund escrow, member records, system data and past mutual-aid obligations would require a mature contingency plan; otherwise the mutual-aid business would stall.

So this is only a direction for further study. We will keep consulting professionals to test the whole process, design the voting rules and the handover safeguards, and then widely solicit members’ views. Only when the whole plan is sound and mature will it be submitted to members for deliberation and a vote.

The purpose of building the Panel is to give members a channel of checks and balances. The core of every new authority is to keep mutual aid stable and protect the interests of the majority of members, gradually improving our self-governance mechanism within the bounds of law.